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I. INTRODUCTION
Cutting a pathway through the lush, tropical rainforests and the largest
freshwater lake in Central America, the proposed Nicaraguan Canal is a
five-hundred-year-old dream that may very well come to fruition.
Following an announcement by the Nicaraguan government and the
Chinese firm, Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co.
(HKND), the two have contracted to build a 170-milelong waterway
through the center of the poverty-stricken nation at an estimated cost of
$40 billion.'
* Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, J.D. expected 2018.
1. Tim Johnson, Remaking World Trade? China's Might Driving Planfor Nicaragua
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Prospective economic development and revenues from the Canal offer
tremendous opportunity for Nicaragua and its citizens, a country which
currently ranks behind Haiti as the second poorest nation in the Western
Hemisphere. 2 Comparing the undertaking to Egypt's recent investment in
its Suez Canal, the attitude for many Nicaraguans is that the Canal is "not
even really about economics. It's about national pride." 3 However,
despite the promises of per capita GDP growth and increases in real
wealth, protests have erupted amongst Nicaragua's citizens refusing to
surrender their ancestral lands to eminent domain, feeling that the Canal
will not bring forth the promised results.4 Many Nicaraguans see the
Canal as a corrupt contract between is increasingly authoritarian
government under Sandinista, Daniel Ortega, and the domineering
Chinese government, through their puppet company, HKND.5 Other local
and international
objections
come from economists and
environmentalists, both of whom see little net gain to warrant the colossal
undertaking. 6 While the Canal project is currently not keeping pace with
its already ambitious schedule, the HKND has essentially a 100-year
window-through its original 50-year concession and 50-year renewable
concession-on a large strip of land crossing Nicaragua, allowing the
7
Chinese firm flexibility in the mammoth waterway's construction.
Along with the incessant economic, social, and environmental
contentions, an even greater political issue emerges from the north as the
United States stands poised to interject based upon its longest-standing
foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine. Declared in 1823 in the Era of Good
Feelings, the Monroe Doctrine outlined a general U.S. foreign policy that
was aimed at insulating the young republics of the Western
Hemisphere-many of whom molded their revolutions after that of the

Canal, MCCLATCHY DC (June 18, 2015), http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/features/Nica

Canal/?brand-mcd.
2. Id.
3.

Jared Malsin, Egypt hails $8bn Suez Canal Expansion as Gift to World at Lavish

Ceremony, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/
06/egypt-suez-canal-expansion.
4.

Evan Ellis, The Interoceanic Canal, and U.S. Constructive Engagement Toward

Nicaragua, GLOBAL AM. (June 26, 2016), http://theglobalamericans.org/2016/06/interoceaniccanal-u-s-constructive-engagement-toward-nicaragua/.
5.

Nicaragua Canal, HKND-GROuP.coM, http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=list&

catid=35 (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter HKND]; David Boddiger, Nicaragua Canal
Survey off to Rocky Start Marked by Fear and Mistrust, Tico TIMEs (Sept. 4, 2014)
http://www.ticotimes.net/2014/09/04/nicaragua-canal-survey-off-to-rocky-start-marked-by-fearand-mistrust..
6. See generally Ted Andersen, Nicaragua'sBig Dig, WORLD POL'Y J., Summer 2015,
http://wpj.dukejoumals.org/content/32/2/28.full.
7. Id.
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United States-from the preying eyes of European monarchs. 8 Appearing
almost as a quid pro quo offer to the great European powers, the Doctrine
seemingly agreed to keep the United States out of European affairs as
long as European powers agreed to refrain from meddling in the affairs
of newly independent Latin American nations. While European powers
did not fully respect the values and goals of the Doctrine, the United
States did not always properly utilize it to foster democracy and peace in
the region's young, and volatile nations.9 Since its introduction, the
Doctrine has been applied as justification for over a dozen U.S. military
interventions in the region that have both stabilized and destabilized
to create
Hispanic nations and their neighbors, but have mainly proven
0
feelings of animosity and distrust toward the United States.1
While the Doctrine plays a decreasing role as this regional divide
grows, the People's Republic of China is perched to fill the void as it
wields its tremendous financial resources to gain influence in the
region." While China already has strong interests in Latin American
nations like Venezuela and Costa Rica, the proposed Nicaraguan Canal
represents a watershed moment as it is not only a direct economic
challenge to the U.S.-built Panama Canal, but also establishes a de facto
Chinese foothold in the Western Hemisphere.12
Although Secretary of State John Kerry unwisely and preemptively
declared the Monroe Doctrine dead, its application is needed now more
than ever if the United States is to counter Chinese expansionism.' 3 While
this notion of halting and reversing Chinese neocolonialism with the
Monroe Doctrine sounds semi-reasonable on its face, this effort requires
more than just the words of a long-dead president; it demands tremendous
solidarity among the United States, Latin American nations, and other
great powers of the world.14 While an amalgam of approaches should be
8. Daniel P. Erikson, Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine, 107 CURRENT HIST. 58, 58
http://www.unc.edu/world/2008Seminars/EriksonMonroe%20DoctrineFeb%20200
(2008),
8.pdf, Jay Sexton, The US and Spanish American Revolutions, THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/age-jefferson-andOF AMERICAN HISTORY,

madison/essays/us-and-spanish-american-revolutions
9. Ellis, supra note 4; see Brian Loveman, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in
the 19th Century, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY (2016),

http:/latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.000 l/acref
ore-9780199366439-e-41?print=pdf; Sexton, supra note 8.
10. Erikson, supra note 8, at 60.
11. See Gonzalo S. Paz, Rising China's "Offensive" in Latin America and the U.S.
=
Reaction, 30 ASIAN PERSP. 95, 95 (2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704566?seq 2#page
scan tab contents.
12. Jon Lee Anderson, The Commandante's Canal, NEW YORKER (Mar. 10, 2014, 3:02
PM), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/10/the-comandantes-canal.

13.

Id.

14.

Paz, supra note 11, at 105.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29

employed to achieve this objective, this effort must begin and end with a
renewed, refurbished view of the Monroe Doctrine.
If the United States truly seeks to defend its interests, prevent the
construction of the Nicaraguan Canal, and slay the dragon of Chinese
neocolonialism in the Western Hemisphere, then a compilation of shortterm and long-term policy and legal approaches must be carefully and
confidently pursued. The first section of this comment details the varied
backgrounds of these issues, including the history of Nicaragua and its
canal ambitions from the Columbian era to the present day, the Monroe
Doctrine and the U.S. interventions in Latin America, the rise of Chinese
neocolonialism in the Western Hemisphere, and U.S. interests in
preventing Chinese expansionism and reengaging Latin America in a
proactive, mutually-beneficial manner.
The second part of this comment details proposed solutions to the
issues identified in the first part, outlining short-term and long-term
objectives and the means to accomplish such. In the short-term, the
United States must mobilize the various environmentalist groups and
indigenous rights groups to challenge the Canal's construction on their
respective legal and public relations grounds: environmentalists lay
numerous claims regarding the immense environmental destruction and
the indigenous rights groups lay claims pertaining to the expropriation of
indigenous lands protected under the Nicaraguan constitution and the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 15
While serving the dual purpose of promoting these groups' interests and
utilizing such groups as proxies against the Chinese scheme, the United
States must appear neutral in these legal issues so as not to blemish or
pollute their proceedings and create more anti-American animosity. If
successful, these legal challenges will either succeed in their respective
goals or at least greatly delay the project, causing the Chinese to cut their
losses and abandon the endeavor; both of which would spell doom for the
Canal.
In the long-term, the United States needs to dramatically reshape its
policy approach toward Latin America and East Asia with significantly
increased cooperation, financial investment, and democratic promotion
in both regions. Particularly, the United States must harken back to the
original, nobler goals of the Monroe Doctrine in forging a renewed
relationship with Latin American nations based upon mutual respect and
fair dealing. With the coupling of the 21st century reimagining of the
renewed Monroe Doctrine and heightened pivot to Asia policy, the
United States can provide a bulwark to Chinese neocolonialism in both
15. UN. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Mar.
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DR1PS-en.pdf
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the eastern and western hemispheres. 16 While both the short-term and
long-term goals are important and praiseworthy in and of themselves,
their respective successes depend heavily on each other as the failure of
one objective implodes the other. With this rapprochement, the United
States can truly fulfill its self-proclaimed destiny as a promoter of
democracy, capitalism, and the true beacon of liberty.
II. BACKGROUND

With the rapid advance of globalization since the Second World War,
cultures and economies that previously only knew each other from a
distance suddenly find themselves unavoidably interwoven into the fabric
of their future development. This sudden burst of economic and social
interconnectivity between once-alien nations is forging a geopolitical
landscape that is swiftly evolving at a rate not seen since the arrival of
Christopher Columbus upon the shores of San Salvador in 1492. Just ten
years later, Columbus explored the eastern shores of modern-day
Nicaragua, initiating a period of immense change for the people and
history of the small Central American nation.
A. From Dusk till Doctrine and up to the Modern Day
Landing upon the shores of Nicaragua in 1522 with their guns, germs,
and steel, the Spanish Conquistadors successfully suppressed and
conquered the indigenous peoples of the region in the name of gold,
glory, and God. 17 Following Nicaragua's incorporation as part of the
Viceroyalty of New Spain in 1538, the Spaniards soon realized the
significance of the isthmus region for crossing between the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans. 18 Colonial authorities conducted surveys in 1551 and
1781 to determine the feasibility of a canal through either Nicaragua,
Panama, or the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico; however, both
attempts failed to find a practicable route and adequate funding. 19 While
16.

Richard C. Bush, The Response of China's Neighbors to the US. "Pivot" to Asia,

BROOKINGS (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-response-of-chinasneighbors-to-the-u-s-pivot-to-asia/.
17.

NicaraguaCanalProject 304 Years Old, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Apr. 25, 1891, at 3;

CARLOS MELENDEZ, HERNANDEZ DE CORDOBA: CAPITAN DE CONQUISTA EN NICARAGUA

53

Editorial San Jos6 (1976), http://www.enriquebolanos.org/data/media/book/CCBA_-_SERIEHI
STORICA - 09 - Hernandez de Co/oCC%81rdobapdf.
18. Id.
19. Id.; Central American Canal Routes Considered, THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS, https://people.hofstra-edu/geotrans/eng/ch I en/appl 1en/mapcentral-american-canal_
routes.html.
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the canal dreams of the Nicaraguan people failed to come to fruition
under the colonial regime, Nicaragua would have a new birth of freedom
and opportunity with its independence from Spain and Mexico in 1823 *20
Upon gaining independence, Nicaragua was part of the Federal Republic
of Central America and its leaders contracted 21
for surveys to be conducted
project.
the
in
interest
further
raise
in 1826 to
"[I]f the canal is to be a shower of gold, it will fall upon New York; if
a river of gold, it will flow into her lap." 22 While N.Y. State
Assemblyman Elisha Williams used these eloquent words to describe the
immense economic benefits that the Erie Canal would bestow upon New
York City and the rest of the populace, they perfectly embody the general
attitude of most of the Nicaraguan government toward the construction
of the Canal, both then and now; and just like the citizens of New York,
the citizens of Nicaragua have strong doubts and concerns. Following the
completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 and the ensuing "Canal Mania" era
in the United States, Secretary of State Henry Clay formally proposed the
construction of the Nicaraguan Canal.23
Although the aspiration of building a canal across Central America
had been around since the Spanish conquest half a millennia ago, this
proposal was the first realistic and legitimate attempt to construct the
waterway, and the Nicaraguan government greatly desired the financial
support of the United States. 24 Despite the nation being at the height of
canal mania, the support of Henry Clay, and an increasingly proactive
foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, Congress rejected the proposal
on the grounds that the nation was too politically unstable. 25 This
assessment was not far off as Nicaragua later descended into one of many
bloody civil wars, one of which would ruin the Canal's second best
chance of being constructed by Cornelius Vanderbilt.2 6
20. Robert S. Smith, Financingthe CentralAmerican Federation,1821-1838, at 43 HISP.
AM. HIST. REV. 483, 509 (1963), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2509898.

21.

ld. at 483, 509.

22.

DAVID HOSACK, MEMOIR OF DE WITr CLINTON 450 (1829).

23.

Smith, supra note 20, at 485, 509; A Canal to Nowhere? Weighing the Risks in

Nicaragua, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON

(July 7, 2015),

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/

article/a-canal-to-nowhere-weighing-the-risks-in-nicaragua/; Congressional Series of United
States Public Documents, Vol. 511 (1847) at 66, https://books.google.com/books?id =
rH9HAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA3-PA66&lpg-RA3-PA66&dq=Federal+Republic+of+Central+Ame
rica+canal&source=bl&ots=3iPpYafsL1 &sig=mUMQ 120SnscNboG97NwruPxODjg&hl=en&s

a=X&ved=OahUKEwjJ5I7AhsTXAhXE7SYKHSJ6AxE4ChDoAQgpMAE#v--onepage&q=Fed
eral%2ORepublic%20of%20Central%2OAmerica%2Ocanal&f-false.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. RUSSELL WHiTE, THE NICARAGUA GRAND CANAL: ECONOMIC MIRACLE OR FOLIE DE
GRANDEUR? 7 (2015).
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As one of several attempts by the United States and its citizens to
influence Nicaragua, the powerful New York tycoon, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, received a contract in 1849 granting him the rights to build a
railroad and eventually a canal across the country; however, the venture
was halted due to civil unrest. 27 After this failed attempt, the United States
and Great Britain signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 declaring
that neither country should pursue a canal through Nicaragua, a move
28
which effectively blocked any real chance of the Canal's construction.
Even the takeover of the country by AmericanfilibusteroWilliam Walker
in 1856-57 could not revive ambitions of the waterway. 29 Several
different visionaries and imperialists proposed their interoceanic canal
plans throughout the nineteenth century, but all failed to come to
30
fruition.
The greatest opportunity for the Nicaraguan Canal's construction
came in the period of 1898-1902 when the United States, with
imperialistic aims, determined to build an interoceanic canal through
Panama or Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the political dealings of Frenchhired lobbyist, William Nelson Cromwell, undermined Nicaragua's canal
bid. 31 As France held interests in Panama from their failed canal,
Cromwell proceeded to weaken Nicaragua's chances by distributing false
leaflets to U.S. Congressmen featuring photos of Momotombo, the
volcano on the shores of Lake Nicaragua and the proposed canal route
erupting. 32 Coupled with the recent disaster of Mount Pele's eruption on
Martinique, this falsity convinced many in Congress that Nicaragua was
not only too politically unstable, but now too environmentally unstable
to construct a canal, allowing Panama to claim the riches and fortunes of
their canal.33 Since this devastating defeat in 1902, the concept of a
Nicaraguan canal has remained a mere hope and fantasy, but the HKND
Group's proposal may very well be the answer to this long awaited
prayer.
Adding insult to injury, the United States-utilizing the recently
espoused addendum to the Monroe Doctrine: the Roosevelt Corollarysoon occupied Nicaragua in 1909 to remove nationalist president Jose
Santos Zelaya and support the Conservative faction. 34 The United States
27. Lawrence A. Clayton, The Nicaragua Canal in the Nineteenth Century: Prelude to
American Empire in the Caribbean, 19 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 323, 324, 326 (1987).
28. W-ITE, supra note 26, at 11.

29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Clayton, supra note 27, at 352.
WHITE, supra note 26, at 8-9.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at1l.
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proceeded to occupy Nicaragua in two separate intervals of 1912-25 and
1926-33, eventually establishing and supporting the dictatorship of
35
Anastasio Somoza Garcia.
Amplifying the undesirable obstruction of the Canal's construction,
the United States and Nicaragua signed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in
1914, which granted the United States the exclusive right to construct a
canal through the country.3 6 As the United States already constructed and
controlled the Panama Canal, this treaty essentially acted as a noncompete agreement and represented another devastating defeat for
Nicaragua's canal dreams. Generations of Nicaraguans have referred to
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty as "the worst agreement inthe history of the
37
country.

Since the treaty, the relationship between the United States and
Nicaragua has been anything but amicable. The United States' most
infamous involvement with Nicaragua is undoubtedly the Iran-Contra
Affair, an embarrassing episode for President Reagan and U.S. foreign
policy. 38 There, the United States used funds gained from the illegal sale
of arms to Iran to finance, arm, and train guerilla fighters-the Contrasto fight against the leftist Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas-the current
heads of the Nicaraguan government.3 9 The United States pursued similar
actions to stymie or overthrow leftist governments in Latin America,
including funding guerillas in Guatemala and El Salvador, and frequently
invading Panama. 40 While the United States wished to abandon its heavyhanded approach to Nicaragua and Latin America, the threat of
communism and its spread throughout the Western Hemisphere forced its
hand, which was a maneuver of realpolitik that has further damaged its
benevolent influence.
B. The Monroe Doctrine'sDuality of Democracy and Deceit
In the backdrop of these miscarried canal pursuits and civil wars, a
chief U.S. foreign policy emerged that has stood the test of time: the
Monroe Doctrine. Primarily authored by then-Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams and proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, the
Doctrine declared the newly-independent republics of Latin America to
be forever free from renewed European colonialism. 4 1 Specifically,
35.

Id.

36.
37.

Id.at 10.
Id.

38.
39.
40.

Id.at 30.
Id.
Id.

41.

BRIAN LOVEMAN, No HIGHER LAW: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WESTERN
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President Monroe stated in his State of the Union address:
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations
existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare
that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our
peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of
any European Power, we have not interfered and shall not
interfere. But, with the Governments who have declared their
independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we
have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged,
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them, or controlling, in any other manner, their destiny, by any
of an
European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation
42
States.
United
the
toward
disposition
unfriendly
The Doctrine essentially defined a quid pro quo arrangement between-,
the United States and European colonial powers: you stay out of our
hemisphere and we will stay out of yours. Through this implicit
agreement, the United States staked its claim to a sphere of influence over
Latin America.43 Perhaps not originally intended to become a cornerstone
of America's own brand of imperialism, the Doctrine soon reinforced the
U.S. hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.
As the Doctrine became a staple of U.S. foreign policy, it morphed
and branched off into several different directions with each tentacle
adopting its own interpretation and impact. Always the purveyor of
American exceptionalism and excess, President Theodore Roosevelt
forged his own addendum to the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt
Corollary. Born out of the Venezuela Crisis of 1902, Teddy Roosevelt
cited the Doctrine as justification for the United States to intervene in the
affairs between Western Hemispheric nations and European powers,
acting as the chief adjudicator in such issues. 44 While the Rough Rider
may have meant well by protecting younger republics against European
colonial powers, his Roosevelt Corollary embodied a rising American
imperialism that treated Latin American nations not as equals but rather
like protectorates, a relegation these nations naturally resented.45
While not only limiting the ability of Latin American nations to forge
HEMISPHERE SINCE 1776, at 46 (2010).
42. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 22-23 (1823).
43. LOVEMAN, supra note 41, at 48.
44.

See GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

SINCE 1776, at 369, 371, 372, 377 (2008).
45. Id. at 372, 377.
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their own diplomatic relationships, the Roosevelt Corollary became a
justification for U.S. military intervention into the Banana Republics of
Central and South America as the United States sought to promote
stability-as well as U.S. economic interests. 46 Subsequently, U.S.
presidents have cited the Roosevelt Corollary as justification for military
interventions in Haiti (1915-34), the Dominican Republic (1916-24), and
Nicaragua (1909-10, 1912-25, and 1926-33). 4 1 Unfortunately, due to its
frequent application in military interventions, this imperialist version of
the Monroe Doctrine has become widely viewed as the Monroe Doctrine,
damaging the legacy of a foreign policy that originally only sought to
promote and, if necessary, protect the newly-emerging republics of the
48
Western Hemisphere.
While some denounce the Doctrine as an imperialist proclamation, the
United States and key Latin American nations chose to redirect and
redefine it as a means to promote peaceful relations throughout the
Western Hemisphere. 4 9 Just as his relative forged his version of the
Doctrine in the form of the Roosevelt Corollary, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt sought to establish a different, more original version in the
form of the Good Neighbor Policy.So Rebuffing the Roosevelt Corollary
in his first inaugural address, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed his new
approach to the Doctrine and to Latin America:
In the field of World policy, I would dedicate this Nation to the
policy of the good Neighbor- the neighbor who resolutely respects
himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others- the
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of
51
his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.
President Roosevelt reinforced this new diplomatic atmosphere of
mutual respect and refrain from military intervention at the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933.52 There, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull declared that "[n]o country has the right to intervene
46. Id. at 369-72, 377.
47. THOMAS ANDREW BAILEY, THE AmEvICAN SPIRIT: SINCE 1865, at 199 (1998); Thomas
Ladenburg, Chapter5: The Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary,DIGITAL HISTORY, 19-

22 (2007), http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/teachers/lessonplans/pdfs/unit8-5.pdf.
48. See HERRING, supra note 44, at 369-72.
49. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Good Neighbor Policy, 1933,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1 936/good-neighbor.

50.
STUD. Q.
51.
52.
edu/2Oth

Mark Gilderhus, The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications, 36 PRESIDENTIAL
5, 13 (2006).
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933).
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 26, 1933), http://avalon.law.yale.
century/intam03.asp.
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in the internal or external affairs of another." 53 While these policies best
embody the original principles of the Doctrine, the need to defend against
influence quickly led the United States to stretch
Soviet and communist
54
these limits.
Following the international crises of the Second World War and
facing the rise of the Soviet Union and its menacing communist influence,
the United States mirrored its actions with NATO by signing the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Pact,
in 1947. 5' Together with most members of the Organization of American
States (OAS), this treaty promised the mutual assistance of every member
56
to defend against military aggression from foreign entities.
Unfortunately, Nicaragua-along with other leftist governmentswithdrew from the Rio Pact in 2012. 57 Nonetheless, the Rio Pact
illustrated the continued influence and effective enforcement of the
Monroe Doctrine in assuring the mutual protection of the Western
Hemisphere against foreign aggression.
As the United States became relatively more understanding of its need
to cooperate with Latin American nations as equals and forge stronger
international bonds, particularly with the looming threat of communism,
it sought to solidify these relationships through international bodies that
espoused the values of the Monroe Doctrine and other shared values. One
such incarnation is the OAS, an organization formed to promote
58
economic, military, and cultural cooperation among its member states.
Formed as the successor to the Pan-American Union on April 30, 1948,
the OAS represented a pivotal step in the reimagining of the Monroe
Doctrine as it sought to "continentalize" the Doctrine by institutionalizing
the notion that an attack on one nation in the Western Hemisphere was
an attack on all nations. 59 Essentially, the OAS approved of the original
purpose of the Doctrine, but framed it so as to remove the connotation
that the United States was the great adjudicator and instead rested

53. WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD,
1750 TOPRESENT 376 (2d ed. 1994).
54. Gilderhus, supra note 50, at 14-16.
55. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21
U.N.T.S. 3.
56. Id.
57. EEUUlamenta que Bolivia, Ecuador,Nicaraguay Venezuela se retirende TIAR [U.S.
Regrets Bolivia, Ecuador,Nicaraguaand Venezuela Withdrawfrom TIAR], EL UNIVERSAL (June

6, 2012, 5:31 PM) http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/120606/eeuu-lamenta-que-boliviaecuador-nicaragua-y-venezuela-se-retiren-de-t.
58.

Organization of American States (OAS), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.

britannica.com/topic/Organization-of-American-States.
59. Id.
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authority in the General Secretariat and other bodies of the OAS. 60
Additionally, the OAS stood as a central bulwark to Soviet and
communist intrusions in the region,
representing a key Cold War tool to
6
be used in the coming decades. 1
The United States has not shied away from invoking the Monroe
Doctrine and the power it entails through its accompanying organizations.
Some may still remember President John F. Kennedy's declaration in a
news conference on August 29, 1962:
The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President
Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we
would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western
Hemisphere. And that's why we oppose what is... happening in
Cuba today. That's why we have cut off our trade. That's why we
worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist
menace in Cuba. That's why62we'll continue to give a good deal of
our effort and attention to it.

Through his denunciatory speech, President Kennedy fervently
reinforced the U.S. commitment to the Monroe Doctrine and its ideals to
resist the intrusion of hostile foreign governments-the Soviet Union in
this instance-into the Western Hemisphere. Further, President Kennedy,
along with the OAS, included a strong repudiation of communism within
the framework of the Monroe Doctrine and the OAS.63 In revoking
Cuba's membership in the OAS, Resolution VI declared that "MarxismLeninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the
alignment of such a government with the communist block breaks the
unity and solidarity of the hemisphere."' 64 In the decades to follow, these
declarations by the United States and the OAS served as the grounds for
several more U.S. military interventions into countries like Grenada,
Panama, and even Nicaragua.
While some may attempt to declare his actions a failure as the
dictatorial Castro regime was not ousted and Cuba remains communist to
this day, this assessment is inaccurate as President Kennedy succeeded in
60.

Id.

61.

Id.; see JORGE HEINE & BRIGITTE WEIFFEN, 21ST CENTURY DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN

THE AMERICAS: STANDING UP FOR THE POLITY 33 (2015).
62. John F. Kennedy, President, The President's News Conference (Aug. 29, 1962)
(transcript available in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=8839.
63. Organization of American States, Six Report on the Situation of PoliticalPrisonersin
Cuba, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/11.48, doc.24 (1979), http://www.cidh.org/country

rep/Cuba79eng/intro.htm.
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his goal of excluding direct Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Although the rhetoric of the Cold War is gone, the fact remains that China
is a communist nation, Nicaragua is forging an alignment with China, and
Nicaragua-through its leftist Sandinista government-frequently
espouses Marxist-Leninist ideology. Should the OAS wish to do so, it has
grounds under this Cuban precedent to call for the suspension or
expulsion of Nicaragua from the OAS.
On the whole, the United States and its Monroe Doctrine have served
as a protective force for Latin America, shielding it from the hostile
desires of European colonial empires, but in this process, these nations
were subjected to the United States' own overbearing brand of
imperialism. While this apparent paternal role has created and continues
to create resentment amongst Latin Americans, it has become adopted
into the framework of the OAS, the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights, and even Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter-replacing the position
of the United States with these institutions. Therefore, while the arguably
negative, resentful aspects that grew out of the Doctrine were
encapsulated in these institutions so as to remove that animosity, the
original aspirations of the United States and its Doctrine can again be
brought forth to promote a new era of positive, productive relationships
between the United States and Latin America.
C. The GrandScheme
Announcing the proposal for the Grand Nicaraguan Canal in June
2013 and unveiling vague plans sparsely over the last few years, the
HKND Group has been incredibly silent and discrete in transmitting the
exact path, dimensions, and costs to the general public. From the bare
minimum amount of information that has been released, the essential
details of the project can be laid out. According to varying news articles
and HKND's few published reports, the Grand Nicaraguan Canal will be
approximately 170 miles long, cost $40-50 billion, and construction will
last from December 2014 until sometime in 2019; however both of these
dates have been shifted back.65
Recently founded by Chinese entrepreneur Wang Jing, the HKND
Group received a controversial no-bid contract from the Nicaraguan
government--dominated by President Ortega's leftist Sandinista
faction-and received a fifty-year concession of ownership with the
65. Nicaragua Canal Route: Atlantic-Pacific Link Unveiled, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28206683 [hereinafter Link Unveiled]; Andres
Oppenheimer, Four Years Later, Nicaragua's$40 Billion Interoceanic Canal Remains a Pipe
Dream, MIAMI HERALD (July 5, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columnsblogs/andres-oppenheimer/article 159689339.html.
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option of a fifty-year extension. 66 The Nicaraguan government will
initially own 10% of the canal ownership, receive a $10 million annual
payment, and receive full ownership of and revenue from the canal after
all concessions are concluded.67
In addition to the canal, the HKND Group is to construct
accompanying roads, railroads, telecommunication lines, resorts, ports,
and an

international

airport.6 8 These roads, railroads,

and port

infrastructure will serve to make Nicaragua a major transshipment hub
for interoceanic trade as well.6 9 One major facet of the Nicaraguan Canal
that notably differentiates it from the Panama Canal and thus warrants its
construction is its ship capacity of 23,000 TEUs, which nearly doubles
the Panama Canal's capacity of 13,000 TEUs. 70 The significance of this
larger capacity will be further detailed in the next Part, but this
substantially higher cargo limit represents the company's foresight and
ambition in capturing the increasing volume of world trade.
Those who have evaluated the project details provided by the HKND
group should realize that such information is lacking, especially as the
project stands as one of the largest infrastructural undertakings in human
history. 7 1 Aside from data pertaining to world trade projections meant to
bolster their justification for the canal, the details included in this
comment represent nearly all of the information released by the HKND
group, further emphasizing their hushed, and bare minimum approach to
transparency. Perhaps the most closely guarded, variedly reported, and
pertinent detail of the coming canal is the path it will cut through the
country. According to the most recent reports, the Nicaraguan Canal will
begin at the Pacific Ocean through the canalized Brito River, enter and
exit Lake Nicaragua, and continue eastward via canal and the canalized
Punta Gorda River to the Caribbean Sea. 72 This route is claimed by the
HKND Group to be "the route with the least environmental and social
impact," but local resistance and protests have erupted, as the poorest
73
communities seem to be the most affected from the proposed pathway.
The specifics of the Nicaraguan Canal open up a wide discussion on the
66.

See supra note 65.

67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
WHITE, supra note 26, at 24-25.

70. HKND, supra note 5.
71. Suzanne Daley, Lost in Nicaragua, a Chinese Tycoon's Canal Project, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/world/americas/nicaragua-canal-chinese-

tycoon.html.
72. Link Unveiled, supra note 65.
73. Mark Anderson, NicaraguaCanal Will Wreak Havoc on Forests and DisplacePeople,
NGO Warns, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2014/sep/30/nicaragua-canal-forest-displace-people
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potential benefits and detriments that accompany its construction and the
tradeoffs between the two effects, leaving the reader to determine the
waterway's worthiness.
D. ComparingPanama'sEconomic Success to Nicaragua's
Economic Aspirations
Of all the challenges and opportunities that the Grand Nicaraguan
Canal confronts, its competition with the Panama Canal will determine
its historical and economical fate. At its heart, the construction of a
second canal through Central America represents the economic beauty of
pure competition by offering consumers the option of choosing an
alternative to the Panama Canal. In that regard, economists should praise
the Nicaraguan Canal as an egalitarian project, something China is not
typically associated with. Nevertheless other economists simply believe
that a second canal is unnecessary, economically foolhardy, and will only
serve to overcrowd the transportation infrastructure in the area,
diminishing usage and revenues for both waterways.
Comparing the Panama and Nicaraguan Canals side by side, they are
48 and 170 miles long and have capacity limits of 13,000 and 23,000
TEUs, respectively. 74 According to the HKND Group, the Nicaraguan
Canal's larger TEU capacity will allow ships to pass through it quicker
than the Panama Canal, despite the former's longer length.' 5 The larger
TEU capacity offers a key to the Nicaraguan Canal's success over its
local rival as trends indicate that ship capacities are increasing at
accelerated rates. 76 In good economic times, world trade will be at its
height, clearly leading to increased traffic through the Nicaraguan Canal.
Conversely, in hard economic times, world trade will decrease, but this
will still give Nicaragua the advantage over Panama. 77 This is because
shipping companies will pack more goods on their ships, increasing their
capacities as to decrease the number of ships required, thereby reducing
their overall cost.78 When this happens, the Nicaraguan Canal will be the
only waterway able to accommodate these ships, as the Panama Canal's
TEU capacity is too small.79
To address this problem of low TEU capacity, the Panama Canal
74.

HKND, supra note 5; Link Unveiled, supra note 65; Johnson, supra note 1.

75. Id.
76. WHITE, supra note 26, at 17.
77. Id. at 17-18.
78. Ministro Paul Oquist promueve inversiones en Londres [Minister Paul Oquist
PromotesInvestments in London], EL 19 DIGITAL (June 17, 2015), http://www.ell9digital.com/a
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completed a $5.25 billion expansion to build a third set of locks, but this
only increased the capacity from 5,000 to 13,000 TEUs, a full 10,000 less
than its potential rival. 80 Following completion, economist Paul Oquist
predicts that 30% of trade ships-which carry 60-70% of the world
trade-will still be over the Panama Canal's new capacity, a percent that
is only projected to increase in coming years. 81 Regardless of TEU
capacities, maritime trade through the region is projected to reach $1.4
trillion by 2030, supplying an ample market for both canals to coexist
successfully. 82 These numbers should dissuade most critics of the
Nicaraguan Canal's economic potential, particularly in regards to its
competition with neighboring Panama Canal, but severe doubts remain.
For the Nicaraguan people, the debate over the Canal's construction
pertains to more than just drawing data comparisons between it and the
Panama Canal: their country's economic wellbeing and future are at
stake. Nicaragua stands as the second poorest nation in the Western
Hemisphere, behind only the notoriously ill-fated nation of Haiti, with
over a quarter of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector, an
unfortunate fact as the country is in the midst of a drought.83 Expanding
on Nicaragua's destitution, both the unemployment rate and poverty rate
stand at approximately 50%,84 with 80% of the population living on less
than $2 per day. 85 More specifically, 80% of the indigenous population,
the people primarily affected by the Canal's path, are living on less than
$1 per day, as of the most recent U.N. assessment in 2008.86 The
Nicaraguan nation has been shaken by civil war, natural disasters, and
simply poor fortune, all of which have severely crippled its economy. For
many of Nicaragua's citizens, constructing the Canal and reaping its
promised benefits is the only way to lift the country out of economic
turmoil and invigorate prosperous growth for generations to come. 87 For
80.

Mimi Whitefield, Water begins tofill massive PanamaCanal ExpansionLocks, MIAMI

HERALD (June 28, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/article25717330.html; HKND, supra note 5.
81. Oquist, supra note 78; HKND, supra note 5.
82. WHITE, supra note 26, at 17.
83. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.ciagov/
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naysayers that refute these hopeful growth figures, the Nicaraguan
government and people frequently cite the exemplar case of Panama and
its canal that has brought the nation so much success and affluence.
To further accentuate the tremendous economic differences between
the two Central American nations, comparing key economic indicators
side by side paints a clear picture of Nicaragua's optimism. As of 2016,
Panama and Nicaragua's GDPs stand at $55.2 billion and $13.2 billion,
per capita GDPs stand at $13,680 and $2,151, and unemployment and
underemployment stands at 2% and 50%, respectively.8 8 These simple
determinants of economic health clearly display how much better off
Panama is than Nicaragua, and the hope of the latter that a canal will bring
about similar statistics. A canal can not only produce a positive economic
effect, but can also reinvigorate a nation and its people with a greater
sense of optimism and national pride that further accelerates national
growth. 89 That hope is exactly what Nicaraguan leaders and Canal
proponents are grasping onto in their construction campaigns.
Promises of magnificent and oftentimes outrageous economic growth
have been the principal method of Nicaraguan leaders for garnering
public support for the massive construction project. 90 Francisco
Telemaco Talavera, an academic and head of the Grand Canal
Commission, is holding town meetings across the country, principally in
areas that will be majorly affected by the Canal's path, to convince those
still resisting its construction of its worth. 9 1 In his public relations
campaign, Telemaco claims that over 50,000 construction jobs will be
created, as well as 200,000 jobs to follow in the wake of the Canal's
completion and an economic growth rate of 14%.92
Although these predictions are overly optimistic, jobs will inevitably
be created by the Nicaraguan Canal and more jobs will follow from this
increased economic activity. However, the politicians are making
promises of results that will occur in the long-term, and many
Nicaraguans fairly argue that their expropriated farmlands are and have
93
been their only possessions and source of subsistence for generations.
Soon to be expelled from their ancestral lands, these people have known
Interoceanic-Canal-July-2014.pdf.
88. CIA, supra note 83; Country Comparison Panama vs Nicaragua, COUNTRY
Life
in
ECONOMY.COM,https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/panama/Nicaragua;
Nicaragua,UNLDOS NICARAGUA, http://unidosnicaragua.org/our-work/life-in-nicaragua/.

89.
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90. Carrie Kahn, A Chinese Man, a $50 Billion Planand a Canal to Reshape Nicaragua,
NPR: PARALLELS (Aug. 14, 2014, 10:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/paralIlels/2014/08/14/
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no other way of life, have been given no real promises or details on their
futures, and are expected to survive and carry on for the next 5 years until
the Nicaraguan Canal is supposed to be completed. 94 Regardless of the
likelihood that the Canal will be successfully built, generate jobs, and
raise the nation's economic standing similar to that of Panama, the
Nicaraguan people have their concerns
with the long run guarantees, a
95
distrust that will be hard to erode.
E.Distrustand Social Unrest Among Nicaraguans
With the stunning lack of information, secretive dealings, and
subsequent mystery that has surrounded the Nicaraguan Canal, it is not
surprising and perfectly reasonable that rumors and protests have plagued
the country in the past year, increasing in intensity as the starting date
nears. Local and international aggression stems from the environmental
damage, uprooting of families from their traditional lands, secretive
manner in which deals have been made, and the alleged collusion of the
HKND Group with the Chinese government. 96 All of these grievances
have varying degrees of merit, with some based on scientific data and
others based on raw, unadulterated emotion of the people.
Despite the Nicaraguan Canal's rivaling of the Panama Canal standing
as an archetype of pure competition, the manner in which the construction
contract was granted to the HKNJD Group screams of corruption and
preferential treatment. 97 In an approach more fitting to business practices
in China itself, President Ortega and the Sandinista government granted
a no-bid contract, including fifty to one-hundred year ownership
concessions to the Chinese firm, which also has no experience in canal
construction.98 Many critics decry this arrangement as a corrupt bargain,
reinforcing their disdain with claims that Wang Jing's
telecommunications firm, Xinwei, was previously granted a virtual
monopoly on Nicaragua's communications industry. 99 The firm was
supposed to expend and invest approximately $700 million dollars in the
nation's telecom infrastructure, but has "so far shown little sign of any
spending, leading to skepticism about Wang's competence to build a
canal.' ' 100
94. WHoTE, supra note 26, at 42.
95. Boddiger, supra note 5.

96.

Id.

97.
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99.

WHITE, supra note 26, at 21.
Id.at 20-22.
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In addition to Wang's perceived incompetence, many view the
shadiness of the entire arrangement as a further indicator of the project's
possible connection with the Chinese government. As the authoritarian
Chinese government is highly involved in the operations of its industries,
advocates and critics alike see the Nicaraguan Canal project as a sneaky
maneuver for "the Chinese planting their flag right in the heart of the
Western Hemisphere." ' '1 Such presumptions of Chinese government
involvement are unfounded rumors and hearsay, but the possibility is
certainly not far from reality. Wang has attempted to dissuade these
allegations, asserting in one of his few interviews that he has no family
connection to the Chinese government, military or Communist Party,
insisting that, "I am a very normal Chinese citizen. I couldn't be more
normal." 102 In spite of Wang Jing and the HKND Group's emphatic
defense of their motives and intentions, thousands of Nicaraguans have
poured out into the streets in protest.
Fearful of their future and alarmed at the perceived Chinese incursion
into their land, many of Nicaragua's poorest citizens have mounted
protests in opposition to the canal. Many living in canal's proposed path,
whose land must be bought, state that they are forced to sign confusing
and ambiguous documents surrendering their property, oftentimes at
below market price. 103 Some foreign reporters investigating the protests
have reported being harassed by Nicaragua soldiers, including Belgian
photojournalist Michele Sennesael, who claims Nicaraguan solders
forced her to leave the country while she was reporting on the Canal's
potential impact upon the communities. 1°4 Chinese engineers who now
must be defended by Nicaraguan soldiers, survey farmers' lands without
saying much to anyone and demand deeds and ownership rights from
workers who have tilled the same properties for generations. 10 5 In
response, several large protests have taken place where the rural farmers
have clashed with police and commonly shout, "[w]e do not want 'the
10 6
Chinese here," and "the police are on the side of the Chinese."
101. Kahn, supra note 90.
102. NicaraguaCanal Plan Not a Joke- Chinese Businessman, BBC NEWS (June 26, 2013),
http://www.bbc.con/news/world-latin-anerica-23058301.
103. Tracy Wilkinson, Secrecy and Doubt Surround Nicaragua'sHuge Canal Plans, L.A.
TrMES (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/great-reads/la-fg-cl-nicaraguacanal-20140909-story.html#page=l; WHITE, supra note 26, at 47-48.
104. Danae Vilchez, Gobiernoexpulsa afotoperiodistabelga [Government Expels Belgian
Photojournalist], CONFIDENCIAL (Feb. 1, 2015), https:/confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/
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Regardless of whether the protestors' fears and anger are in response to
the future uncertainty they face or the real hostility they harbor for what
they perceive as Chinese imperialism, President Ortega, the Nicaraguan
government, and the HKND Group must find an adequate tactic to calm
the tensions amongst some of the country's poorest.
F. Environmentaland Indigenous Rights Complaints
While many Nicaraguan citizens certainly remain uneasy regarding
the actual necessity feasibility of constructing the Canal, the
expropriation of land for its construction, and the specter of Chinese
neocolonialism, the Sandinista government faces its greatest domestic
and international criticism from environmental advocates and indigenous
rights groups. Oftentimes overlapping in their respective causes,
objectors from these two different subject matters cite a lack of
transparency and information regarding the Canal endeavor and look to
stymie the project until their concerns are addressed. Still, the cause of
environmental advocates is not as enforceable and impactful as that of
the indigenous rights groups: the latter has guaranteed rights under the
Nicaraguan constitution while the former does not. However the key for
both cohorts is not solely to succeed in a legal sense but to succeed in a
moralistic, public opinion sense.
The potential damage that the Nicaraguan Canal could inflict on the
nation's environment is a tremendous inhibitor to its construction and a
serious fear that the HKND Group must dissuade. As the economy of
Nicaragua has been largely underdeveloped, much of its land has been
10 7
preserved as rainforests and kept free from industrial pollution.
Protected and preserved as UNESCO-established biospheres, these
rainforests are inhabited by endangered species "including jaguars...
tapirs, green macaws, [and] ... sea turtles," and are a pivotal link in
Central America's biological corridor."' 10 8 The canal's ambiguous path
will plow directly through the Reserva Natural Cerro Silva and Lake
Nicaragua, irrefutably causing environmental destruction, at least to
some degree, to the areas. 109
Aside from the damage inflicted on the biological hotspot in the
nation's eastern portion, thousands of large freighters carrying all
varieties of goods will cross Lake Nicaragua, including large oil
tankers." 0 Over three thousand square miles in size, Lake Nicaraguaknown in Nicaragua as Lake Cocibolca-is the largest freshwater body
107.
108.
109.
110.
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in Central America and represents the drinking supply for the majority of
Nicaraguans, as well as the site for numerous local industries that the
country's economy relies upon.1"' If the Canal is completed, Lake
Nicaragua runs the risk of pollution from the increased water traffic, as
well as the increasing risk of oil spills, seismic activity, habitat
destruction, and introduction of invasive species. 112 Just as it worried the
U.S. Congress in 1902, the seismic and volcanic activity in the region
gives pause to the very real threat of an eruption and its effects upon the
operation of the Canal.' 1 3 What's more, Lake Nicaragua could suffer the
irrevocable damage 14of salinization, destroying the only source of drinking
water for millions.'
With the numerous environmental concerns, the immense and largely
irreversible ecological damage that the Canal will inflict upon Lake
Nicaragua is by far the most egregious. While today President Ortega
appears eager to construct the Nicaraguan Canal at any and all cost, his
ambitions today run counter to his statements just several years ago. In
2007, President Ortega stated,
We can't risk [the] Lake [Nicaragua] for all the gold in the world.
There won't be enough gold in the world to make us yield on this,
because the Great lake is Central America's greatest water reserve,
and we're not going15to put it at risk with a mega project like an
interoceanic Canal.'
Apparently, President Ortega found enough gold in the form of his
agreement with HKND to construct the Canal through the country and
the goldmine that is Lake Nicaragua. Perhaps President Ortega is hoping
that this lake of gold filters into the proposed waterway and creates a
canal of gold for his people. However, President Ortega and his oncedecried "mega project" run into issue with Nicaragua's General Water
Law (Law 620), which states that the lake "should be considered a natural
reservoir for drinking water, as this is of the highest national interest and
priority for national security."'1 16 It remains to be seen how exactly
President Ortega and the Sandinista government intend to remain faithful
to the General Water Law (Law 620) while simultaneously opening up

111.

Id. at 32.

112.

Id. at32-33.

113.
114.
115.

Id. at36-37.
Id. at33-34.
Id. at 33; V.M. Campos Cubas, The Canal will IrreversiblyDamage Lake Cocibolca,

REVISTA ENvo 384, availableat www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4726 [hereinafter Cubas, The Canal
will IrreversiblyDamage Lake Cocibolca].

116.

Id.at 32-33.
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the nationally-imperative body of water
to salinization, decreased water
117
quality, and high risks of pollution.
The HKND Group has claimed they are attempting to mitigate these
risks, hiring the environmental consulting group ERM to conduct studies
into the supposed hazards. 1 18 According to the HKND Group, ERM's
studies conclude that the Canal will certainly have environmental and
social impacts, but such can be offset and the Canal can ultimately
provide greater benefit. "19 However, opponents refute the results as they
have not been made public except to a select group of local Nicaraguan
leaders as "it would be impossible to comply with the methodology or the
foreseen goals with a large group."' 120 Environmental opponents of the
Canal project and HKND's transparency come from both inside and
outside of Nicaragua, including the Nicaragua Academy of Science, the
Nicaraguan Climate Change Alliance, and the Centro Alexander von
Humboldt. 12 1 HKND and the Nicaraguan government have attempted to
address these concerns by meeting with several environmental groups,
such as the Wildlife Conservation Society, Ramsar Convention, and
International Union for the Conservation of Nature. 122 Still, the
withholding of information by HKND only adds to the mystery and
distrust that has been accompanying the canal project since its inception.
Despite the ecological harm that will inevitably follow the Nicaraguan
Canal, proponents relentlessly push for its construction while assuaging
the overall environmental damage by citing the Kuznets Curve. The
Kuznets Curve presents a cycle where an undeveloped country with a
relatively pristine environment begins to industrialize, increasing
pollution and diminishing its natural health. 123 When that country reaches
a certain state of economic growth and industrialization, its citizens will
desire a healthier environment, leading to stricter regulation at the

117. National Water Authority, National Water Law: Law 620 and Enabling Regulations
for the National Water Law Dectree 44 - 2010 (Sept. 2010), http://www.anagob.ni/
DocumentosSiAGUA/Leyes/Ley_yDecreto 620 Ingles.pdf.
118. Id. at 36; HKND Group, Nicaragua Canal Development Project Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment, http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=86.
119. HKND Group, Canal de NicaraguaEnvironmental and Social Impact Assessment:
Executive Summary, 75, http://hknd-group.com/upload/pdf/20150924/en-summary/Executive

%2OSummaryo2OoP/o2OEnvironmental%20and%2OSocial%20lmpact/o20Assessment%20%28
ESIA%29.pdf.
120. Boddiger, supra note 5.
121. WHITE, supra note 26, at 32-33.
122. Id. at 35-36.
123. James Galbraith, Global Inequality and Global Macroeconomics, 29 J. POL'Y
MODELING 587 (2007); see David I. Stem, The EnvironmentalKuznets Curve, INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY FOR ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS (June 2003), http://isecoeco.org/pdf/stem.pdf
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expense of low production costs and economic growth. 124 With the

greater wealth that this nation and its citizens have received from their
period of industrialization and ecological degradation, they will be
environment will, in
economically better off in the long term and 1their
25
theory, recover to near its pre-industrial state.
Canal advocates and general supporters of the Kuznets Curve state
that the resulting increased economic activity will allow for more funds
to be committed to environmental protection, but citizens enduring the
26
pollution and natural destruction must take these promises on faith.'
Yet, some economists, such as Joseph Stiglitz and particularly Benjamin
Friedman in his book, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth,
reject such a notion as they feel one cannot put a price on ecological
damage, especially when its results are irreversible, such as the extinction
of endangered species. 127 Reinforced by Friedman's points, the
environmental destruction that will occur is a primary detriment weighing
on the proposed benefits that the Nicaraguan Canal promises to bring
forth.
The pivotal question in all this is, "how much pollution and
environmental degradation is too much to allow for potential economic
growth?" That question is much harder to answer, and depends mainly
on the respondent, the relative success of the Canal and its promises, and
the amount of time that has passed since its completion. Alas, the first
component is prone to bias, and the latter two are not able to be answered
for the foreseeable future.
Even if President Ortega manages to placate the Nicaraguan citizens
and allay the fears of environmentalist groups, the HKND group and the
Nicaraguan government face a steeper uphill battle as a large portion of
the Canal's proposed route crosses through the indigenous territory of
Rama y Kriol. While the Nicaraguan government and the HKND group
may have a relatively easier time expropriating or buying out the lands of
other resistant Nicaraguan citizens, the land belonging to the indigenous
peoples of Rama y Kriol is both sacred to them and directly protected by
the Nicaraguan constitution.
Indigenous people have a rich and cultured history in Nicaragua, a
history that is centered in the eastern region of the country known as the
Rama y Kriol Territory and historically known as the Mosquito Coast.
124.

BRUCE

YANDLE,

MAYA VIJAYARAGHAVAN,

&

MADHUSUDAN

BHATTARAI,

THE

ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A PRIMER 4 (The Property and Environment Research Center

2002), https://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/Yandle Kuznets02.pdf.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 17.
WHITE, supra note 26, at 35; see Stem, supra note 123.
BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005); see

Stem, supra note 123.
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According to the current plans, approximately 40% of the Canal's route
will cut directly through this indigenous territory of 407,000 hectares and
threatens to displace thousands on a population base of only 15,000.128
While the general policy of land expropriation and eminent domain for
infrastructural projects receive their usual fair share of controversy, this
proposal cuts deep as the sovereignty of the Rama y Kriol Territory is
promised to the indigenous peoples in perpetuity according to
Nicaragua's 1987 Constitution (and in its 1995 and 2000 reforms) in
articles 5, 89, and 189.129
Nicaragua's Law 28 guarantees the indigenous communities their
autonomy and Law 445 guarantees their property rights over the lands
they inhabit. 130 The Nicaraguan government passed Law 445 following
the ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in the
case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua in
2001.131 This ruling has become a cornerstone of the "doctrinally robust
set of indigenous rights protections within the Inter-American system,
upon which both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights have relied in later
cases." 132 Under these laws and guidelines, these indigenous lands cannot
be sold, taxed, mortgaged, or ceded to anyone, and "[t]he communal
133
lands are indissoluble ...and they are eternal."
Further, the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) protects the land rights of indigenous persons through the
combination of Articles 25 and 26.134 Under UNDRIP:
Article 25 recognizes the right of indigenous peoples "to maintain
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands," while
Article 26 establishes that indigenous peoples have the right to the
lands or territories that they have traditionally owned or used,
including the right to use, development, and control, and which
128. Kate Kilpatrick, Canal "Will Destroy We," AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://projects.aljazeera.com/2015/04/nicaragua-canal/displaced.html; WHrrE, supra note 26, at
38.
129. WHITE, supra note 26, at 40.
130.
131.

Kilpatrick, supra note 128.
The Double Life of InternationalLaw: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries,

129 HARv. L. REv. 1755, 1759 (2016), http://harvardlawreview.org/2016/04/the-double-life-ofintemational-law-indigenous-peoples-and-extractive-industries/
[hereinafter Double Life];
WITE, supra note 26, at 40.
132. Id.at 1759.
133.

WHITE, supra note 26, at 40.

134. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 26
(Sept. 13, 2007).
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demands state recognition according to 35
the traditions and land
concerned.1
peoples
the
of
systems
tenure
Nicaragua, China, and the United States are all signatories of this
declaration and President Barack Obama announced in 2010 his firm
support of the ideals contained therein.' 36 While President Donald Trump
likely does not share President Obama's views on the applicability of
U.N. resolutions and other international laws upon the sovereignty of
nations, President Trump's views will not impact this comment's
suggested approach as it does not require the Trump Administration to
address their applicability-it actually requires the opposite: their silence
on the matter.
A seminal intersection of the environmental and indigenous rights
issues is found in the landmark events surrounding the James Bay Project,
a massive hydroelectric operation in northern Quebec completed in
phases beginning in 1971.137 Although not as nation-altering to Canada
as the Canal would likely be to Nicaragua, the two projects are
comparable in terms of their cost and sheer immensity, but also for their
impact upon the local environment and indigenous peoples. 38 While
producing enough electricity to power the entire nation of Belgium,139 the
infrastructural project threatened the ecology of a vast area of northern
Quebec due to flooding from reservoir creation, building up of toxins in
the waters, and alterations to migratory routes. 140 What's more, the
project greatly impacted the lifestyles of the James Bay Cree peoples,
whose economy-based upon hunting and fishing-and culture were
severely impacted by the project's construction, as well as the
construction of support roads and the arrival of numerous construction
workers. 14 1 To address the issues involved with upending much of the
Cree's historical and cultural lifestyles, as well as negatively impacting
the environment, the Cree people and the Canadian government agreed
135.

Double Life, supra note 131, at 1759 (quoting G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 134, art.

25).
136. Krissah Thompson, US. Will Sign UN. Declaration on Rights of Native People,
Obama Tells Tribes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/contentarticle/2010/12/16/AR2010121603136.html.
137. Paul Wertman, Planningand Development After the James Bay Agreement, 3 CAN. J.
NATIVE STUD. 277, 278 (1983).
138. Id.
139.

GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC, USING ENERGY TO BUILD THE QUEBEC OF TOMORROW 10

(2006).
140. Wertman, supra note 137, at 280; Amin U. Sarkar & Serkan Karagoz, Sustainable
Development of HydroelectricPower, 20 ENERGY 977, 979 (1995).
141. Id. at 278-80; Grand Council of the Crees, Social Impact on the Crees of James Bay
Project, http://www.gcc.ca/archive/article.php?id=38.
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to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. 142
Although hampered by numerous legal challenges and temporarily
halted by the courts at one point, the construction of the hydroelectric
43
project proceeded despite strong objections from the Cree people.
While opinions continue to differ about the impact of the agreement, the
agreement was successful for the Cree people because it acknowledged
their relationship to the land, extended greater autonomy, and provided
financial compensation for the environmental and social damage to the
Cree people and their region. 144 Relating the James Bay Project to the
current Nicaraguan Canal endeavor, the primary lesson and point of
comparison that should be illuminated is that major infrastructural
projects can be bogged down and indefinitely halted by the legal claims
of indigenous groups, especially if they have a constitutionally-reinforced
right to the land. The recent success of Native American groups to-at
least temporarily-halt construction on the Keystone Pipeline in the
Dakotas further demonstrates the power and viability of such movements
to shape public opinion and halt infrastructural projects.

G. Modern Day Nicaragua,the Rise of Chinese Neocolonialism, and the
American Response
Merging these wide-ranging issues surrounding the Canal projectenvironmental damage, violation of indigenous rights, growing
Nicaraguan distrust of their government and the Chinese influence, and
the threat to the historically American hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere-lies an increasingly prominent thread that threatens the
status of the United States and its values both in the Western Hemisphere
and around the globe: the rise of Chinese neocolonialism. As China seeks
its place in the sun, it has amplified its financial and diplomatic
engagement throughout the world, particularly as it relates to trade and
maritime matters.1 45 Setting aside the massive investment that China and
its state-run companies have poured into underdeveloped regions in
Africa and Asia, China and Chinese firms have invested significantly in
port infrastructure in places like Piraeus and Antwerp so as to gain greater
142. Id. at 279.
143. Grand Council of the Crees, Social Impact on the Crees of James Bay Project,
http://www.gcc.ca/archive/article.php?id=38.
144. Id. at 279-80; US GovernmentHalts Oil Pipeline Opposedby Native Americans, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37322266.
145. WHoTE, supra note 26, at 24-25.
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access for Chinese shipping,
creating a String of Pearls across the Indian
46
Ocean and into Europe.
At first glance, China's investment around the world to better promote
and facilitate Chinese shipping is not particularly disconcerting as it is
expected and justified for a nation to encourage its industry. However, as
it concerns American interests and its de facto preeminence in the
Western Hemisphere, if one zooms out, views the larger picture, and
connects the dots of these Chinese actions, it reveals a well-coordinated
strategy to create and subsequently dominate a new trade network where
the Nicaraguan Canal is a centerpiece. 147 Along with the proposed
construction of the $28 billion Kra Isthmus Canal through southern
Thailand, Chinese President Xi Jinping described this ambition in 2013
as a 21 st century "Maritime Silk Road," part of the larger One Belt, One
Road Initiative. 14 8 While these projects are spearheaded by supposedly
private Chinese firms, critics contend that the firms-such as HKNDsimply represent a buffer for the Chinese government so as to insulate it
from embarrassment if the project is delayed, suffers cost overruns, or is
never completed. 149 Judging from the seemingly close relationship and
numerous meetings between Xinwei, HKND's founder Wang Jing and
the Chinese Communist Party, it becomes an increasingly clear strategy
to allow "Beijing some protection against a risky investment."1 5 0
To complement the promotion of their "Maritime Silk Road" and One
Belt, One Road Initiative, the Chinese government has invested heavily
in Latin American nations, using this trade and investment as a means to
impose its own brand of imperialism.151 Increasing their total trade with
Latin America from $12 billion in 2000 to approximately $250 billion in
2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has promised to double this trade
volume over the next decade.1 52 As of 2014, Chinese state-owned banks
146.

Id.at 24.

147.
148.

Id.
Wu Jiao & Zhang Yunbi, Xi in Callfor Building of New 'Maritime Silk Road,' CHINA

DAILY USA (Oct. 4, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://www.chinadailyasiacom/news/2013-10/04/content_
15091004.html; Joseph V. Micallef, The Geopolitics of the Kra Canal, MILITARY.COM (Oct. 4,
Where Will
2017), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/10/04/geopolitic-kra-canal.html;
China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Lead?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 22, 2017),

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-match-thehype/.
149.
150.

WHITE, supra note 26, at 25.
Peter T. Leach, Are NicaraguaCanal PlansDriven by Geopolitics?,J. CoM. (Oct. 20,

2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/trade-lanes/are-nicaragua-canal-plansdriven-geopolitics 20141020.htm]; WHrrE,supra note 26, at 24.
151. WHrTE, supra note 26, at 26.
152.

Maria Siow, China-LatinAmerica Ties Raise Concerns,CHANNEL NEwSASIA (Apr. 19,
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have loaned more to Latin America than the value of loans from the InterAmerican Development Bank and the World Bank combined. 153 This
Chinese investment comes at a time when investment from the United
States has fallen by 20% since 2011, filling a crucial gap. 154 Previously
fueling a commodities boom in Latin America, the recent slowdown in
Chinese exportation threatens this growth and may be the reason for the
current delay in the construction of the Canal. 55 Nonetheless, Chinese
investment has spurned other infrastructural projects meant to improve
transportation of and access to trade goods, including an agreement to
build a railroad across Colombia, as well as connecting the Brazilian
Midwest to the Pacific Ocean via a new rail network. 5 6 To aid in this
investment and strengthen Chinese-Latin American relations, China and
Brazil together formed the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB)
over opposition from the United States. 157 Of course, China has its own
pivotal interests-aside from trading its own goods-as it seeks to secure
consistent sources of minerals, metals, food products, and especially
oil. 158

Still, Chinese investment comes with more strings attached than
simply providing dependable access to minerals, metals, food products,
and oil: China is demanding diplomatic, political, and economic
concessions. Often the central target of its foreign policy aims, China
seeks to further isolate Taiwan by prefacing its assistance with the
5 9 As part of its
demand that the recipient nation cut diplomatic relations. 1'
"One China" policy, Beijing has systemically sought to remove and
replace Taiwan's diplomatic and economic ties with Latin America, a
region that has historically supported the island republic. 160 Having
recently flipped Latin American nations like Costa Rica, 16 1 officials in
Taipei are gravely concerned that Nicaragua will soon join the anti2015,
12:36
AM),
http://www.channelnewsasia~com/news/business/china-latin-americaties/179301O.html; WHrrE, supra note 26, at 26.
153. Venezuela 'Receives $5bn in Finance from China,' BBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32381250.
154. Siow, supra note 152.
155. WHITE, supra note 26, at 27.

156.

Id

157.

ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS, CHINA'S EVOLVING ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA: CAN IT BE A

WIN-WfN? 14 (Ati. Council Adrienne Arsht Latin Am. Ctr. 2015), http://publications.atlantic
council.org/chinalatam/ACCHINA090915DP.pdf.
158. WmTE, supra note 26, at 27.
159. Id. at 27-28.
160. Id.
161. Taiwan Loses Costa Rica'sSupport, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2/hi/asia-pacific/6729035.stm.
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Taiwan cohort, a move which appears imminent and likely. 162 Overall,
China is deepening its ties in Latin America with increased investment,
trade, and diplomatic involvement, a move to displace not only Taiwan
but also the United States.
Even more pertinent is Panama's recent breaking of diplomatic
relations with Taiwan in June 2017 and the increasingly likely
relationship between this decision and increased Chinese investment in
terminals on either end of the Panama Canal. 163 While Chinese firms are
purchasing controlling stakes in ports around the globe and scheme to
construct a canal to rival Panama's, Panama Colon Container Port
(PCCP), COSCO, and other Chinese shipping firms have recently
invested $900 million in an expanded terminal at Colon on the Atlantic
side and, along with Hutchison Port Holdings, are strongly pursuing a
contract to develop a new terminal at Corozal on the Pacific side.164
With their growing control over Panamanian terminal operations, the
Chinese may not even need the Nicaraguan Canal to dominate
hemispheric trade networks, but the canal project could represent an ace
up their sleeve. In the short-term, Panama and the United States may view
such investments as benign, but their long-term potential for malignancy
is far too great to ignore. Perhaps Panama and these Latin American
nations will see such apparent Chinese diplomatic demands as a small
price to pay, or perhaps these nations will soon realize that they are
dancing with the devil in the pale moonlight.
More important than China's desires to develop increased economic
and diplomatic relations with Latin America and to further isolate Taiwan
is the immense influence that China will garner from constructing the
Canal and subsequently emanate from Nicaragua into the Western
Hemisphere. Of course, there is the obvious fact that China will control a
key trade and transportation link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans,
a power position it can wield to force other nations to abide by its will.
162. Ralph Jennings, After Panama, Who's Next to Cut Ties with Taiwan in Favor of
China?,FORBES (June 13, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/06/

13/after-china-grabs-a-key-diplomatic-ally-to-spite-taiwan-heres-who-falls-next/#3421

fdf545ee;

Wendy Lee, Nicaragua Might be the Next to Break Relations with Taiwan: Sources, TAIWAN
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:14 PM), http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3056040.
163. Elida Moreno, Panama Just Forged Ties with China, While Ditching Relations with
Taiwan, TIME (June 12, 2017), http://time.com/4815921/panama-china-taiwan-beijing-

diplomacy/.
164. Brenda Gob, China State Firms Eye Land Around Panama Canal - Waterway
Authority, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-canal-land/china-

state-firms-eye-land-around-panama-canal-waterway-authority-idUSKBN16Y13J);

Angela Yu,

China to Build Panama's First Post-PanamaxContainerTerminal, FAIRPLAY (May 20, 2016),
https://fairplay.ihs.com/ports/article/4268601/china-to-build-panama-s-first-post-panamax-conta

iner-terminal.
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While precedent determines that such canals and waterways remain open
and independent for all peaceful purposes regardless of the transiting
nation, the Canal is technically being constructed by a private firm
whereas the other canals and waterways were either constructed by
national governments or determined to be in international
waters;
165
therefore, HKND is setting its own precedent with the Canal.
Just as the Nicaraguan people willingly disregard the economic doubts
and simply see the Canal as a source of national pride, the Chinese
government-along with its state-owned and state-supported
companies-pursues megaprojects that both heighten its prestige and
create logistical and strategical advantages. Discussing the risks of
Chinese investment in the United States and applicable to the majority of
Chinese investment, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission released its annual report to Congress in November 2016,
noting that China's state-owned and state-controlled companies, aside
from being blatantly anti-free market, represent "potential economic
distortions" that invest "based on strategic rather than market-based
considerations." 166 While some would continue to argue that HKND is a
private entity and not part of the Chinese government, the Commission
again notes the "thin line" existing between a state-owned operation and
a private firm as the Chinese government can still exercise a considerable
degree of "control" over such private firms through "direct or indirect
ownership, preferential lending by a state bank, board member
appointments, or forcing an agreement among shareholders."1 67 Hard
facts and common sense reveal a glimpse of China's ulterior motives
behind their primafacie benevolent efforts, demanding that one view the
whole picture of the project rather than taking a means-to-an-end
approach.
Through their private entities, the Chinese government is known for
duplicitously using its private investments as multipurpose undertakings
that support their stated economic goals, but also serve geopolitical and
military purposes. 168 Brahma Chellaney, professor of Strategic Studies at
165. WHITE, supra note 26, at 30-31.
166. Zachary Brez & Samad Pardesi, Interesting Times Ahead for CFIUS and Foreign
Investors, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2016, 10:13 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/769470/
interesting-times-ahead-for-cfius-and-foreign-investors (quoting UNiTED STATES-CHINA ECON.
AND SEC. REV. COMM'N, EXECuTiVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2016), https://www.

uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual reports/Executive%20Summary%202016.pdf, at 1-2, 4).
167. Thomas M. Shoesmith, et al., Congress Urged to Block Certain Chinese Investments
in the U.S., PILLSBURYLAW.COM (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-andinsights/congress-urged-to-block-certain-chinese-investments-in-the-u-s.html.
168. James Kynge et al., How China Rules the Waves, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/; Robert Keatley, China's AIB Challenge: How Should
America Respond?, NAT'L INT. (Apr. 18, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-
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New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, commented on the subtle but
swift nature in which China transforms an economic project into a
military one, remarking that "[t]he progression is quite rapid."' 69 If China
chooses to utilize the zone around the Canal as the United States used the
Panama Canal Zone, then there will be massive Chinese military bases in
the heart of Central America. 170 Capable of reaching U.S. military bases
in Panama and Honduras, as well as the United States itself, these
potential military bases implicitly exert Chinese influence throughout the
Western Hemisphere.171 As Chairman Mao Zedong said himself in 1938,
"[p]olitical power grows out of the barrel of a gun."' 172 Even if China
chooses not to utilize the Canal for any military purposes, the Canal's
presence represents a constant source of Chinese nose-thumbing toward
the United States as it challenges its preeminence and Monroe Doctrine.
The U.S. government has officially remained "curiously silent" on the
Nicaraguan Canal and the likely involvement of the Chinese
government. 173 As Jon Lee Anderson noted, "[a]s long as the Canal is
officially a private project, there is little benefit in provoking a public.
174 The only "official" comment came from the
fight with China ....
U.S. embassy in Managua on January 6, 2015.175 The comment merely
requested that reports be presented to the embassy regarding the Canal's
feasibility, financing, and possible environmental impact. 176 It further
noted the embassy's intention to monitor the methodology for resolving
property disputes and speak with the Nicaraguan government on the
bidding process for overseas companies. 177 Aside from these relatively
minimal inquiries, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, remarked prior to the Summit of
the Americas in April 2014 that the United States certainly doesn't
"necessarily plan to have a direct conversation [about the Canal] with
' 178
representatives of the Nicaraguan Government."
This seeming lack of concern from the State Department has left many
strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib- 12666.
169. Kynge et al., supra note 168.
170. WHITE, supra note 26, at 30-31.
171. Id.
172. "Problems of War and Strategy" (Nov. 6, 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, at 224.
173. WHrTE, supra note 26, at 28-29.
174. Anderson, The Commandante 's Canal,supra note 12.
175. WHITE, supra note 26, at 29
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. WHrrE, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Larry Luxner, Activists Visiting Washington Blast
Nicaragua's $50 billion Canal Project as 'Illegitimate,' TICO TiMEs (Apr. 6, 2015),

http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/04/06/activists-visiting-washington-blast-nicaraguas-50-billion-c
anal-project-as-illegitimate).
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confused and dismayed, especially as the project represents a
"strategically vital Canal, built and run by their principal global trade
rival, taking shape in their own backyard."' 179 Critics point out that the
Canal's proposed depth is enough to allow Chinese submarines to
traverse it and that it is not a stretch to believe other Chinese warships
may seek to do the same.1 80 Others argue that this failure to take any
serious stance on the project embodies a weakened and timid American
foreign policy, one that prefers the "wait and see" approach. 181 This
stands in stark contrast to the U.S. firm, resolute foreign policy during the
Cold War where it actively battled communism and its influence
wherever it arose in the Western Hemisphere. As previously discussed,
the United States coordinated several coups against leftist governments,
intervened militarily in Latin American nations with hostile governments,
and propped up infamous dictators all in the name of preventing intrusion
by foreign and communist powers.' 82 However, China is not nearly as
upfront and confrontational with the United States as the Soviet Union
was during the Cold War, instead donning the wolf in sheep's clothing
83
appearance and professing their pursuit of "peaceful development." 1
Still, it is not overly fair to launch such criticisms against the Obama
Administration as the Canal project represents a highly delicate
geopolitical situation that demands treading lightly. Further, the
American people are less likely to accept a heavy-handed response to the
Canal issue as the anti-communist Cold War mentality has largely gone
by the wayside and the recent conflicts in the Middle East incline people
against any prominent intervention. More so, the Obama Administration
may be doing exactly what this comment is advocating; the State
Department may be undertaking secretive maneuverings to impede the
progress of the Canal and remains silent on this monumental
infrastructural project because any statements against it would yield the
previously-noted animosity. 184 It will be interesting to see how the Trump
Administration-and President Donald Trump in particular-will
respond to this Canal undertaking and whether it will follow the
suggestions of secretive maneuverings that this comment is espousing.
Drawing parallels to prior colonial empires, some are comparing the
Chinese construction of the Canal in Nicaragua to the systematic pattern
and effort of the British government to seize control of the Indian
179.
180.
181.
182.

WHITE, supranote 26, at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29-30.
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subcontinent from the British East India Company following the Great
Mutiny of 1857.185 While some allusions to the colonial empires are
unjustified as China does not advance its neocolonial pursuits at
gunpoint, one incontrovertible fact remains clear: the Red Dragon of
China is perching itself in Latin America in order to spread and strengthen
its economic and geopolitical standing. Whether its ultimate aim is to
remove the Eagle of the United States from its perch of power is irrelevant
because China's growing influence-particularly in the Western
Hemisphere-is a direct challenge to the current primacy of the United
States, leaving it only with the option of fight or flight.

I.

SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS OF ABEYANCE AND
RAPPROCHEMENT

For the United States to stymie the advance of Chinese neocolonialism
in the Western Hemisphere, it must simultaneously address the shortterm issue of the Nicaraguan Canal's construction and the long-term issue
of China's financial and political appeal. While addressing these dual
interests in concert, the United States must tread lightly in its approach as
one misstep could jeopardize years of concerted efforts.
Although the Nicaraguan Canal appears to be progressing more
slowly than originally planned and many doubt the commencement of
major construction anytime in the near future, the simple fact remains that
HKND retains a 100-year concession over the right to construct the Canal
and can take its time. While the United States could take a heavy-handed
approach in preventing the Canal's construction-such as economic
sanctions, providing support to anti-Sandinista forces, or a direct military
response-this would only prove to bungle the situation and provide
further proof of the United States' selfish, imperialistic motivations.
Instead, in order for the United States to indefinitely halt the project
without harming its long-term goal of reengagement with Latin America,
it must fly under the radar and operate in anonymity.
A. The Short-Term: Death by a Thousand Cuts
By utilizing interested parties of environmentalist groups and
indigenous rights groups through covert funding and an official policy of
distancing and aloofness toward said groups' efforts, the United States
can direct these groups to legally challenge the Canal project in any and
every way possible without appearing as a domineering, intervening
power. In fact, it is more beneficial to these causes that the United States
185.

Leach, supra note 150.
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remain distant as the potential association of the United States with them
could create a negative connotation that could sink their efforts. In
addition to legal challenges, a massive public relations campaign can be
waged against the Canal by highlighting the project's rather negative
aspects, such as the mass land expropriation from poor farmers, the
immense environmental degradation, and the blatant violation of the
rights of the indigenous communities. Through the utilization of social
media and other news mediums-as well as directing the innate abilities
of the federal government to influence the news and public opinion both
domestically and internationally-a massive, multi-cause campaign can
come to bear on the project, creating a substantial public relations
nightmare for HKND, the Nicaraguan government, and even China itself.
At the very least, the success of this public relations campaign will stymie
the project, buying time for the application of the U.S. long-term
approach to halting the Canal project.
This method will serve as the lingchi-death by a thousand cuts-as
it will inundate the project with so many legal challenges and poor public
relations that it will not only become too burdensome in terms of time
and money for HKND to continue the endeavor, but will also paint the
project in a negative light in the realm of academic and public opinion.
As exhibited with the past and present examples of the James Bay project
and the Keystone Pipeline stoppage, the status of environmentalism and
indigenous rights as two causes that invoke tremendous attention and
concern amongst those in the international and American communities
will be extremely beneficial in hampering the progress of the Canal's
construction. This portrayal of these groups as seeming proxies of the
United States in its efforts to defeat the Canal is not meant to minimize
the significance of their respective causes; rather, it illustrates their
immense importance as their struggles are so substantially meaningful
that they can sink a project as immense as the Nicaraguan Canal. Through
the pursuit of numerous legal challenges relating to environmental
concerns and the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as negatively
portraying the Canal in a strong public relations campaign, the
construction of the Nicaraguan Canal can be stymied significantly and
possibly ceased entirely.
In an era of increased sensitivity to environmental issues, the
Nicaraguan Canal project perfectly embodies an environmentalist call to
arms as the largest freshwater body in Central America and the survival
of innumerable plant and animal species rely upon their success.
Supported through secretive funding from the U.S. government,
environmental advocacy groups can launch legal challenges to the
Canal's construction to stymie the project. Most importantly, these
groups must pursue a strong public relations campaign that shines a bright
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light upon the likely devastating ecological damage that the Canal's
construction and operation will inflict upon the Nicaraguan people and
their environment.
In an effort to stymie or indefinitely halt the massive Canal project,
environmental groups have a good chance at accomplishing this goal by
legally challenging it as a violation of the General Water Law (Law 620)
due to the high likelihood of devastating pollution in Lake Nicaragua,
which would destroy the drinking water for millions. 186 Within
Nicaragua's own borders, several groups-including the aforementioned
Nicaragua Academy of Science, the Nicaraguan Climate Change
Alliance, and the Centro Alexander von Humboldt-are actively
criticizing the Canal project for its likely environmental effects and the
lack of transparency on such. 187 Through the funding of these groups,
both those within Nicaragua and other international organizations, they
can proceed with their legal claim that the Canal violates Law 620. If
successful, the Nicaraguan courts would find the Canal project to be in
violation of Law 620 and halt its construction indefinitely. If the
Nicaraguan courts find that the Canal does not pose a grave threat to the
health and integrity of Lake Nicaragua and thus does not violate Law 620,
then the project would at least have been delayed, allowing time for other
stymieing efforts to be conducted.
The most formidable tactic that environmentalists must utilize is that
of communication. Through financial support of the United States, these
environmental groups must broadcast these issues of ecological
degradation in Nicaragua on every medium of communication, including
television and print news outlets, social media, and others. By portraying
the project in an intensely-negative light, the full weight of public
opinion, both in Nicaragua and internationally will come to bear on
HKND, the Nicaraguan government, and the Canal project.
Aside from illuminating and harping on the environmental detriments
of the Canal, the environmental advocates can grasp upon the
aforementioned statements of President Ortega himself in his
condemnation of any attempt to trade Lake Nicaragua's health for a
"mega project." 18 This hypocrisy will not bode well for President Ortega,
who is increasingly interested in creating a legacy for and a cult of
personality around himself. 189 If successful, the public relations
campaign will portray the project so poorly and unfavorably that either
HKND will temporarily halt or entirely withdraw from the endeavor
186. WHITE, supra note 26, at 32-33.
187. Id.
188. WHITE, supra note 26, at 33; V.M. Canpos Cubas, The Canalwill Irreversibly Damage
Lake Cocibolca, REVISTA ENVIO (July 2013), www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4726.
189. WImTE, supra note 26, at 13.
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and/or President Ortega and his Sandinista government will do the same
for fear of losing the support of the electorate. While pro-canal opponents
may denote these efforts as a cheap smear campaign, the rather damning
claims that could be made against the construction of the Canal are not
unwarranted, such as the immense amount of potential pollution and
destruction of wildlife, as well as allegations of corruption.
Of course, it almost goes without saying at this point that the success
of these environmentalist groups to delay or halt the Canal's construction
greatly depends on the furtiveness of the U.S. promotion and funding of
these groups. If the collusion between the United States and these
environmentalist groups is discovered, then their movement will be
horribly discredited-regardless of how true their claims are-due to
animosity felt toward the United States and the general human reaction
to question or dismiss arguments if ulterior motives or suspicious
collusions are found. 190
As one would naturally assume, the indigenous peoples of Rama y
Kriol are fighting this attempted illegal land expropriation vigorously.
Citing the aforementioned laws and treaties, the Rama y Kriol
government appealed to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court in August 2013,
as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Organization of American States' Convention on Human Rights, and the
International Labour Organization Convention. 191 While the Sandinista
government could take a page from the Canadian example of the James
Bay Project-by meeting with the indigenous groups and formulating a
new agreement to ensure both the project's completion and the
indigenous communities' rights-the Rama y Kriol communities may
simply reject such an agreement due a strong, justifiable wariness about
compromising with a government which has no apparent qualms with
192
upending previous agreements and decisions with that same group.
What's more, unlike the Cree peoples in Canada, the Rama y Kriol
communities have a firmer, constitutionally-protected guarantee to their
property rights
that gives them far greater leverage in shaping the ensuing
93
arbitration. 1

As HKND has admitted that it has not engaged in formal consultation
with the indigenous leadership of Rama y Kriol and the Nicaraguan
government is making the weak argument that the land is not being given
away in perpetuity but rather is part of a time-limited concession of 100
years, the Rama y Kriol government not only has a legal claim that is
strong, but also one that is likely to be drawn out for an extended period
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 29.
Id. at41-42.
Id.
Id.
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194

of time.

While various pro-indigenous rights groups can raise legal challenges
and public relation campaigns against the Nicaraguan government
through its own constitutional structure and courts, such legal victories
may mean nothing to the Sandinista government that has already shown
it does not intend to respect its own laws, court rulings, and constitution.
Therefore, these indigenous peoples and indigenous rights groups can
heighten the legal challenges and public relations scrutiny by seeking the
opinion and assistance of international institutions, namely the
Organization of American States (OAS). Pressure can be brought to bear
on President Ortega and the Nicaraguan government by the OAS and the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights for these direct violations of
indigenous rights espoused by the former and enforced by the latter.
Using the precedents of Cuba's expulsion and sanctions against various
nations such as the Dominican Republic, OAS member states can
authorize various economic and travel sanctions against the country and
195
could even threaten suspension or expulsion from the organization.
With the immense amount of pressure the Nicaraguan government is
already under due to the country's immense poverty, the Canal project's
wide-ranging impacts, and alleged corruption, economic sanctions by the
OAS could be the backbreaking straw that forces President Ortega to
delay or halt the Canal construction.
Now, two issues remain with the utilization of the OAS to stymie or
halt the Canal project. First, the Nicaraguan government can easily ignore
the decisions and declarations of the OAS if such are not accompanied
by firm economic sanctions. Second, the United States is a major player
in the OAS so any action by the OAS can be twisted and subsequently
decried as an underhanded attempt by the United States to halt the Canal
project. Solving the first issue is straightforward: OAS simply needs to
go beyond words by imposing economic sanctions on Nicaragua and
ensure that such sanctions are followed by neighboring member nations.
The second issue is more convoluted because it runs the risk of
imploding the entire effort by the United States to stymie the Canal
project. Any perceived involvement of the United States allows for the
distortion of the effort to protect indigenous rights, instead painting it as
another attempt at American imperialism. To prevent this possible
194.

Id.

195. C. Lloyd Brown-John, Economic Sanctions: The Case of the OAS and the Dominican
Republic, 1960-1962, 15 CARIBBEAN STUD. 73, 73-75, 78, 105 (1975); FREDERICK HENRY
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perception, the United States should either abstain from or vote against
any sanction measures while simultaneously-and secretivelycoordinating the effort through other OAS members. Still, such a public
and high profile decision inevitably runs the risk of being portrayed as an
American imperialistic effort regardless of evidence and stances by the
U.S. government. Further, such sanctions may force Nicaragua into
virtual isolation, allowing for Chinese interests to only strengthen their
growing influence over the country. While utilizing the OAS to
undermine the Canal project could certainly produce results, the best
short-term approach remains for the United States to fly under the radar
and avoid the appearance of any involvement whatsoever.
Therefore, the indigenous peoples of the Rama y Kriol Territory in
eastern Nicaragua have a firm and legitimate grievance against the
advance of the proposed Canal through their historical and sacred land.
Even with their leftist stances, the Nicaraguan government has no legal
right to expropriate the indigenous communities' lands, leaving the door
open for a complex, protracted, and expensive legal battle. If successful
in terms of U.S. goals, the people of Rama y Kriol will either win their
legal challenge or HKND will simply abandon the project due to
overwhelming legal costs and negative public perception. The property
rights of indigenous peoples are not only guaranteed within Nicaragua's
own borders according to its constitution and statutes, but also within the
Western Hemisphere
and across the entire world according to
96
international law. 1

Underpinning this strategy to utilize legal claims of indigenous rights
and environmentalist groups to beleaguer the Canal project is an
immensely important aspect of anonymity. Oftentimes, the issue
plaguing many of the U.S. undertakings is the simple presence of U.S.
involvement. When the United States announces its active involvement
in a project or movement, such becomes a lightning rod for criticism by
unfriendly parties around the globe who assume an ulterior motive or
simply harbor great disdain for the United States for one reason or
another. Granted, a fair degree of that antagonism is warranted as the
United States has a bad track record of supporting dictators and directly
intervening in the internal matters of sovereign nations, particularly in
Latin America, with the objective of creating a situation more amenable
to U.S. interests, not necessarily the interests of that nation's people.
Regardless of whether the U.S. intentions are beneficial or malicious,
anti-American governments and their leaders will certainly frame its
efforts as another imperialist exploitation. 197 It is because of this innate
196.
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hostility and distrust that the United States must keep its actions secretive
and its public comments toward the project neutral or vague.
In any event, the United States is walking a tightrope on a razor's edge
as it risks losing international respect in refusing to directly address the
looming Chinese dragon in its backyard and instead opts to play the long
game by biting its tongue and reengaging Latin America. This is a gamble
the United States cannot afford to lose if it does not wish to be
superseded: the Chinese endeavor to construct the Nicaraguan Canal
must be halted in order to effectuate its long-term objectives and
superiority on the world stage.
B. The Long-Term: Reengagement and the Renewed Monroe Doctrine
As it concerns its political and economic position in the Western
Hemisphere, the United States has progressively shirked and betrayed its
duty to provide for the protection and betterment of Latin America and
its peoples. This American duty is espoused in its longest standing foreign
policy-the Monroe Doctrine-and exemplifies the country's
exceptionalism amongst the other power nations of the world. Instead of
promoting American ideals of democracy, liberty, and capitalism and
resisting the incursion of foreign nations and their influence upon the
oftentimes vulnerable Latin American nations, the United States has
regressed, betraying its values by adopting the same imperialistic traits it
sought to eradicate. In the wake of this regression by the United States, a
power vacuum has naturally formed. This vacuum has allowed China to
increasingly exert its political and economic influence upon the nations
the United States has increasingly overlooked in recent years and
mistreated over the past century. Inorder for the United States to retain
its superiority in the Western Hemisphere and across the globe, it must
reengage the nations and peoples of Latin America with mutual respect,
cooperation, and interests. Representing a return to the original
aspirations of the Monroe Doctrine, this reengagement must come in the
form of increased trade and investment, as well as promoting the best of
American ideals in an atmosphere where the United States is equal and
not domineer to its Latin American brethren.
Reengaging with Latin America requires a token of good faith, part of
which should come in the form of financial and infrastructural investment
from the United States with little or no strings attached. As previously
noted, investment from the United States to Latin America has fallen 20%
since 2011, injuring the region's economies and minimizing the U.S.'s
influence. 198 While the Trump Administration is espousing its "America
198.
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First" mantra, this emphasis on domestic development does not preclude
investment from the United States to promote the further development of
Latin American nations. In fact, this encouragement of investment in the
Western Hemisphere aids the United States as it fosters a growing middle
class in these nations, consumers who will increasingly purchase
American goods and wares. "' Additionally, the investment in
infrastructure is pivotal as it stimulates trade from, through, and to the
region. 20 0 Greater and easier access to trade routes allows for Latin
Americans to sell more of their products to international markets,
decreases the cost to consumers in the United States and across the globe,
and increases access of American goods to these once-isolated markets.
Overall, investment in Latin America by the United States illustrates the
importance of the former to the latter, demonstrating that the United
States is willing to devote its time, energy, and money so that the two
may grow together.
The best way to prevent the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal is
to nullify its principal advantage over the Panama Canal: the higher TEU
capacity. As noted, the proposed Nicaraguan Canal has a 10,000 TEU
capacity advantage over the Panama Canal, which just recently
completed the expansion on its third set of locks, bringing the capacity
from 5,000 to 13,000 TEUs. 20 1 The Nicaraguan Canal's proposed TEU
capacity will allow it to increase its competitiveness compared to the
Panama Canal as the trend of ever-growing ship TEU capacities
continues. 20 2 If the Panama Canal Authority announces and subsequently
undertakes another expansion for a fourth set of locks to increase TEU
capacity, the Nicaraguan Canal effectively loses its primary argument for
construction. This solution represents a long-term solution rather than a
short-term solution because both the planning and constructions
processes are arduously time-consuming, as exemplified by the recent
expansion of the Panama Canal.
While needlessly ruffling feathers and poking the bear does no real
good, the United States must not be afraid to confront Red China on its
various abuses of international law and intrusions into its traditional
spheres of influence. China is certainly not oblivious to the consequences
of their actions and to think otherwise is purely naive. Without risking
the secretiveness of its opposition to the Canal project and jeopardizing
the potential success of its obstruction, the United States must check these
199. Oquist, supra note 78; David Thomas, How the US. Economy Benefits from
International Trade & Investment, BusINEss ROUNDTABLE, http://tradepartnership.com/wp-
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Chinese actions by bringing the challenge to China's own neighborhood.
By increasing political and economic engagement with East Asian and
Southeast Asian nations, the United States can forge an effective bulwark
to China's global influence. China's recent creation and militarization of
artificial islands in the South China Sea stands in direct opposition to the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 3 Brought before
an international tribunal by the Philippines, the Chinese were found to be
in violation of Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS. 2 ° 4 Interestingly, these
two articles do not forbid the creation and subsequent militarization of
artificial islands in areas that were once considered international waters;
rather, they forbid the destruction of fragile ecosystems-another
potential call to arms for environmentalists. 205 Nonetheless, China has
wholly rejected the tribunal's decision and proceeded to claim
islands, threatening even U.S. military
jurisdiction around these artificial
20 6
vessels that transited nearby.
Naturally, this territorial grab angered the surrounding nations of
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and others as they rightly see China
as increasingly domineering by depriving them all of their fair share of
the resources within and beneath the South China Sea.20 7 In a regional
dispute that mirrors the United States with Latin America, the United
States could take advantage by increasing investment and trade with the
aforementioned Southeast Asian nations, drawing them out of the
growing sphere of Chinese influence. Representing the Pivot to Asia, the
United States could reconfigure the now-defunct Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO) with the inclusion of Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and the other aforementioned nations.
While some may contend that this move is undoubtedly an
unnecessary poking of the bear, it is becoming increasingly clear that
China only responds to strength. Exhibiting strength so as to apply
necessary pressure, the U.S. Navy and President Trump recently
announced plans to increase naval forces and spending to their highest
20 8
level since the Cold War in order to meet Chinese challenges.
203.
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Subsequently, these bellicose actions by China and the regional
animosity they create represent an ideal opportunity for the United States
to rein in Chinese neocolonialism around the world-and especially in
the Western Hemisphere.
Underlying all of these proposals is the urgent need for the United
States to refashion the Monroe Doctrine into its originally-intended form:
the promotion of liberal ideals through the protection of vulnerable
nations and their political and economic wellbeing. Despite some past
honorable attempts by the United States to straighten their crooked paths,
the Doctrine has regularly been used to enforce American imperialism in
the name of defeating the self-declared scourges of European colonialism
and communism. Too often, the United States supported brutal dictators
and overthrew democratically-elected governments in order to keep its
grip upon the nations and region. This overbearing relationship between
the United States and Latin America has pushed many nations into the
arms of geopolitical rivals, beginning first with the Soviet Union and now
with Red China. If the United States wishes to reestablish itself as the
exemplar in the Western Hemisphere, it must be resolute in its promotion
and support of democracy, capitalism, and equality and lead by example.
Leading by example must begin and end with a new foreign policy
attitude toward Latin America that puts all nations on an equal footing
regardless of their relative political and economic standing. The incessant
resentment toward the United States can only be dissuaded by a steadfast
position of mutual respect, cooperation, and interests. In order to
demonstrate the U.S. commitment to these values and realigned foreign
policy attitude, it would bode well for the United States to become more
active in and agree to be bound by the OAS and its institutional decisions.
While agreeing to be bound-at least to a reasonable degree-by the
OAS and its decisions may make the United States vulnerable to vengeful
Latin American nations, this would only be a short-term negative impact
as the resulting long-term growth of the U.S. influence in the region
should hopefully normalize relations and stifle prior animosity, largely
ending the aforementioned vindictiveness.
With the exception of invading and occupying every nation in the
Western Hemisphere, this refreshing approach to U.S. foreign policy
using the values of liberalism originally espoused in the Monroe Doctrine
is the best, most straightforward, and respectable means to reestablish
U.S. influence in the region. Just as you catch more flies with honey than
vinegar, the United States achieves stronger, more influential
TLvEs (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.navytimes.com/articles/navy-trump-planning-biggest-fleetexpansion-since-cold-war?utm content-buffer693fd&utm medium=social&utm source-faceb
ook.com&utm campaign=buffer.
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relationships with mutual respect and benefit than with denigration and
heavy-handedness. Matter-of-factly, if boiled down to its most basic
form, the Renewed Monroe Doctrine represents the Golden Rule in the
form of foreign policy: treat others how you want to be treated.
Concerning the labelling of the Renewed Monroe Doctrine, if President
Trump wishes to adopt the foreign policy initiative, it may very well
become known as the Trump Doctrine; for the sake of the United States
and its Latin American brethren, let us hope he does.
IV. CONCLUSION

While construction on the Nicaraguan Canal has largely stalled for the
time being and the project's original completion date will certainly not be
met, the gears of the massive undertaking are still turning as Chinese
engineers and surveyors continue their work and citizens along the
waterway's route continue to tread. For many, the Canal's construction
presents too many unknowns for comfort, unknowns that include the
environmental degradation of Lake Nicaragua and the deprivation of
guaranteed rights from the indigenous populations. One party that does
not appear overly concerned-at least publicly-about the Canal's
construction is the one that stands the lose the most from the arrangement:
the United States. Although this comment is advocating for the continued
silence of official representatives regarding the Canal, it is still peculiar
how indifferently the United States has treated the undertaking. What's
more, the majority of the mainstream media has remained wholly silent
on the project, a position which will have to change if the United States
wishes to successfully employ its short-term solution of launching
negative public relations campaigns. Regardless, the United States must
recognize-at least internally at the highest levels of government-that
Red China's involvement with Nicaragua and its Canal poses a grave
threat to American national security, the sovereignty of neighboring Latin
American nations, and the continuance of the Monroe Doctrine as a staple
of diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.
For better or worse, the Monroe Doctrine aided the United States on
its hundred-year ascension to the seat of hegemony over Latin America
and it now waits in the wings as it witnesses that hegemony crumble over
an equal period of time. Should the United States wish to maintain its
dominance across the globe as a force for democracy and progress, it
must first truly foster this relationship within its own hemisphere and
garner a new era of United States-Latin American kinship through the
Renewed Monroe Doctrine. Only through this leadership-by-example
will the United States counter the dragon of Chinese expansionism both
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in the eastern and western hemispheres. 20 9
As China pursues its neocolonial empire, it does so not with a gun in
hand but rather with cash. With a continually growing economy and a
government flush with cash, China is exploiting its ability to secure trade
access and rapidly expand its influence throughout the globe by investing
heavily in developing nations and their infrastructure. With this generous
dolling out of funds, China hopes to secure strong, lasting relationships
with these nations. However, while dollar diplomacy is not cheap in terms
of monetary cost, it is cheap in its longevity and pervasiveness; once the
cash flow to a nation dries up, so does its allegiance. History should have
taught China of the folly of this approach with examples ranging from the
Romans to the Soviet Union. Better yet, China itself reveals the
foolhardiness of relying upon dollar diplomacy as it usurps Taiwan's
influence across Latin America by outspending its dissociated brethren.
Indeed, the only truly effective and long-lasting form of diplomacy and
influence is one based upon ideology and conviction.
While the tenets of communism and the practice of one party,
authoritarian rule may appeal to some in Latin America and across the
globe, many-particularly the disaffected and downtrodden-should find
greater solace in the notions of democracy, liberty, and the protection of
private property. Coupled with an attitude of mutual respect and benefit,
these principles of the United States embody the approach and
applicability of the Renewed Monroe Doctrine. With a new, firmer
resolve, the United States can fortify its position upon the world stage as
the beacon of hope and prosperity, a position that ensures its continued
preeminence among the nations of the world.
The crux of this comment's argument is this: the United States has a
strong interest in halting the proposed Nicaraguan Canal spearheaded by
China because its success violates the Monroe Doctrine and grants
China-a growing rival to the United States-a foothold in the region,
undoubtedly weakening the U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere
and around the world. If the short-term solutions are successful in
temporarily halting the construction of the Canal and the long-term
solutions are successful in mending the relationship between the United
States and Latin America, then China will no longer pursue the Canal
project and other influence-garnering activities in the region as the
renewed influence of the United States will be too strong to counter.
It is difficult to say that the Canal is an entirely flawed undertaking as
its completion represents a potential source of immense prosperity for
Nicaraguans, a people who have endured centuries of civil war, famine,
and poverty. However, the Nicaraguan people themselves must realize
209.

See Paz, supranote 11.
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the Faustian bargain they are making by accepting gold in return for their
freshwater supply, pristine environment, respect for indigenous rights,
and acceptance of Chinese neocolonialism. Ultimately, this decision rests
with the citizens of Nicaragua and them alone.
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